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Preliminary
Abstract
This paper applies recent advances in the theory of learning to the analysis of
consumer behaviour. The working assumption is that while sellers are rational in the
traditional sense, consumers are boundedly rational. The diﬀerences in outcomes for
search goods and experience goods are investigated. In the latter case, if consumers
fail to take into account that information is only partial, they can become locked into
the habit of purchasing inferior goods. Surprisingly, however, prices are lower than
when information is complete. Firms have an incentive to oﬀer lower prices to prevent
consumers becoming locked into their rival’s product.
∗E.Hopkins@ed.ac.uk, http://www.ed.ac.uk/∼ehk
1 Introduction
Adaptive learning theory attempts to describe the behaviour of agents faced with repeated
decision problems by assuming they use simple learning rules. The principal question has
been under what circumstances do agents learn to choose an optimal action and when do
they become locked into an inferior choice.1 Up to now, this has largely been explored in
the context of abstract environments. However, the same issues are present in the empirical
analysis of consumer behaviour, where marketing analysts attempt to explain the choices
of consumers over diﬀerent brands. The terminology employed is diﬀerent. Agents choose
over “brands” instead of “actions”, or they may have a desire for “variety”, rather than a
tendency to “experiment”. The underlying models are often similar.
In particular, the familiar division of products into search and experience goods has an
exact parallel in the field of adaptive learning. Rustichini (1999) describes the situation where
an agent obtains information on the payoﬀ of only the action chosen as “partial” information.
This corresponds to a consumer buying experience goods, as the consumer only discovers
the qualities of the good she actually chooses, and not about the other brands she leaves in
the store. When the agent sees each period the payoﬀ to all actions, Rustichini terms this
“full” information. This is similar to the situation with search goods, as a consumer can
estimate the qualities of all brands, not just the one he purchases. What Rustichini finds is
that under both partial and full information, depending on the learning rule adopted, there
is the possibility of an agent becoming locked into an inferior choice.
In this paper, I extend the model of Chintagunta and Rao (1996), which examines a
dynamic duopoly where consumers learn over time, to consider a wider variety of learning
rules and information treatments. I find that under full information, learning is complete and
consumers eventually have correct beliefs about the quality of the goods on oﬀer. However,
when goods are experience goods, if consumers fail to take into account that information is
only partial, they can become locked into inferior choices. Surprisingly, this leads to lower
prices as firms compete to lock consumers into their products. If, in contrast, consumers
adopt a learning rule that is optimal under partial information, asymptotically prices will be
the same as under complete information. The diﬀerence is that under partial information,
even with an optimal learning rule, firms can influence consumer opinion in the short run.
What is distinctive about this approach is the mixture of rational behaviour by sellers
and boundedly rational behaviour by buyers. The recent literature on adaptive learning
has largely focussed on abstract exogenous environments. Exceptions that deal with market
models have concentrated on sellers (Capra et al, 2000; Hopkins and Seymour, 2000). How-
ever, there are reasons to believe that models of bounded rationality may have a better fit to
consumer behaviour. As Erdem et al (1999) point out, consumers may be prone to various
1References in this field include Rustichini (1999), Bo¨rgers and Sarin (2000), Heller and Sarin (2001),
Sarin and Vahid (1999).
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cognitive biases. One well known problem is spurious diﬀerentiation, when consumers form
an incorrect belief that one brand or product is superior. For example, one report of the
Consumer Union (1991) found that less than 50% of consumers sample were able in blind
tasting to identify the soft drink brand they claimed to prefer. Yet much of the recent work
on consumer learning about product quality takes the form of consumers making highly
sophisticated inferences from the strategic behaviour of firms.2
The situation to be modelled can be thought of as a consumer going on a regular basis
to a supermarket to buy a grocery item and choosing between two competing brands. This
type of decision has several aspects which I would like to emphasise. First, the prices for
the competing brands are usually clearly marked on the shelves. Thus, the learning the
consumer has to undertake is not about prices or their distribution. However, the goods
in question are typically experience goods. One has to take them home and consume them
before their quality is known. Second, quality in this context is very often subjective, for
example, whether a food product tastes good. Third, because each successive purchase
decision is relatively unimportant to an individual consumer, a model of boundedly-rational
behaviour may explain actual choices well.
This approach has already been taken in marketing. As noted above, marketing analysts
are interested in how consumers choose and how their choices change over time. For example,
a stochastic model of habit-persistence and variety seeking is explored in Seetharaman and
Chintagunta (1998). Chintagunta and Rao (1996) go further in that they analyse the optimal
seller response to a representative consumer who learns adaptively. What is a distinctive
feature relative to the economics literature on learning is that this work is also empirical.
These models are fitted to data on actual prices, sales and consumer purchases.
In the economics literature, there has been some interest in markets where not all con-
sumers switch to the lowest price seller because there are switching costs associated with
changing supplier. This situation has been examined in the context of dynamic duopoly by
Padilla (1995), To (1996) and Chen and Rosenthal (1996). This compares with the current
situation where consumers may be slow to switch between sellers, not because of direct costs,
but because they respond adaptively to changes in prices.
What these models have in common is that, while sellers compete on prices, equilibrium
prices are above competitive levels. This is because consumers switch between sellers only
slowly. This emphasises that the speed and success of learning by consumers will determine
the competitiveness of the market. More recently, Erev and Haruvy (2000) have considered
the implications of adaptive learning for pricing policy. They find that the variability of prices
may slow consumer learning and therefore reduce competitiveness. What the current paper
attempts is similarly to link the success of learning to the amount and type of information
available.
2See, for example, Bagwell and Ramey (1994).
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2 Models of Adaptive Learning
Models of learning have been employed both to explain behaviour in games and in single
person decision making. There is now considerable evidence that it can explain actual choice
behaviour (Erev and Roth, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Erev and Barron, 2001). In games,
payoﬀs are determined by the choices of one’s opponents and in decision problems, by an
exogenous random process, but in both cases, learning rules have three components. First,
a decision maker is endowed with propensities (alternative terms are assessments or weights
or scores), one for each of the possible actions in her action set. Second, there is a choice
rule that chooses an action as a function of current propensities. A general principal is
that actions with higher propensities are chosen with higher probability. Finally, there is an
updating rule, which then changes the propensities in response to payoﬀs.
The propensities of a representative agent at time t we denote as θt = (θ1t, θ2t, ..., θnt) ∈
IRn, when the agent must choose from n actions. At each point in time, the agent chooses
action i with probability xit. The two choice rules that have attracted the most attention
are the reinforcement learning rule
xit =
θitPn
j=1 θjt
(1)
and the logit or exponential rule
xit =
exp(βθit)Pn
j=1 exp(βθjt)
. (2)
In the exponential choice rule, the parameter β represents the degree of optimisation. At
high levels of β the agent will choose the action with the highest propensity with very high
probability.
There are equally two prominent updating rules. The first takes the following form. If
at time t, an agent takes action i and receives a payoﬀ of uit, then
θit+1 = (1− δ)θit + uit
θjt+1 = (1− δ)θjt,
(3)
where δ is a “recency” parameter (δ = 1 implies no memory, δ = 0 implies perfect memory).
In other words, this rule responds only to realised payoﬀs. Only the propensity corresponding
to the action taken is updated. The payoﬀ to other actions at that time was not observed.
Rustichini (1999) refers to this as “partial” information. In contrast, “full” information is
where the agent is able to see the payoﬀs to all actions at each time period. She is therefore
able to update all propensities. For example, one can assume that
θit+1 = (1− δ)θit + δuit for i = 1, 2, ..., n. (4)
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The properties of these diﬀerent learning rules in games are investigated in Hopkins
(2000). Erev and Roth (1998) and Camerer and Ho (1999) both show how these models can
be used to explain data from experimental games. In the context of single person decision
problems, Rustichini (1999) finds the following. Suppose the payoﬀs to the actions are deter-
mined by a stationary probability distribution. Label the action with the highest expected
return under this distribution, action 1. Then, by Propositions 3.2 and 5.2 (Rustichini,
1999), we have the following.
Proposition 1 Consider either the reinforcement rule (1) with partial information or the
exponential choice rule (2) with full information and with δ = 0. Then, almost surely
limt→∞ x1t = 1, that is, the probability placed on the action with the highest expected re-
turn goes to 1.
But, importantly as Proposition 3.4 of Rustichini demonstrates, optimality is not always
achieved.
Proposition 2 If the exponential choice rule (2) is used with the partial information updat-
ing rule with δ = 0, then as t goes to infinity, any one action will be chosen with probability
close to one.
That is, the exponential choice rule in a situation of partial information can be interpreted
as a form of overconfidence. With a high value of β the action that seems the best will be
chosen with a high probability. Therefore, under partial information, the agent may never
find out that another action would actually give a higher payoﬀ.
3 A Model of Dynamic Duopoly
In this section, the dynamic duopoly model of Chintagunta and Rao (1996) (hereafter,
“CR”) with learning by consumers is introduced. We will go on to consider a larger number
of learning specifications than in the original paper. There are two competing firms, who
each produce the same product at constant zero marginal cost. There is some ambiguity
in this model as to whether these two goods are homogenous or diﬀerentiated. What is
assumed is that consumers may possess a belief that one good is better than the other. For
simplicity, we will initially consider a single representative consumer, an assumption that
will be relaxed later. This consumer has goodwill for two sellers equal to (θ1t, θ2t). Each θit
can be thought of as the consumer’s estimate of quality of the ith brand. At each point in
time the consumer seeks to buy one unit of the good.
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The two firms compete on prices in continuous time. At any given time t, their prices
can be written pt = (p1t, p2t). The consumer uses a decision rule of the logit form. That is,
the probability of purchasing from the ith seller is
xit(θ, p) =
exp(βθit + γpit)P2
j=1 exp(βθjt + γpjt)
(5)
where β is a parameter measuring the sensitivity to goodwill, and γ measures sensitivity to
prices.3 It will be convenient to assume that β > 0 and γ < 0. Duopoly with logit demand
functions has been studied in the industrial organisation literature (see for example, Caplin
and Nalebuﬀ, 1991).
The consumer’s goodwill for the two firms will change over time. If she consumes good
i at time t, then she receives a utility of uit. A learning rule in this context will be a way of
updating goodwill θ in response to this experience, giving rise to an equation of motion
θ˙i = fi(θ, x(θ, p), u). (6)
In this paper, I consider three distinct functional forms, each representing diﬀerent be-
havioural assumptions, and each having diﬀering predictions.
Given the assumption of a representative consumer, a firm’s instantaneous profits will be
pitxit. Each firm attempts to maximiseZ ∞
t=0
e−rtpixi(θ, p) dt subject to θ˙ = f(θ, x(θ, p), u). (7)
This in turn gives rise to a current-value Hamiltonian for each firm
Hi = pitxit(θ, p) + µifi(θ, x(θ, p), u) + νifj(θ, x(θ, p), u) (8)
where µi, νi are the costate variables for firm i.
The standard conditions for a Nash equilibrium in open-loop strategies are
∂Hi
∂pi
= 0 for i = 1, 2 (9)
with
µ˙i = rµi − ∂Hi/∂θi, and ν˙i = rνi − ∂Hi/∂θj. (10)
3In Chintagunta and Rao’s original specification, allowance was made for β and γ to take diﬀerent values
for the two firms whereas the utility from consumption of any good was normalised to unity. I opt for a
convention which is closer to the learning literature where β is fixed but utility ui varies across the firms.
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4 A Dynamic Model with Observable Quality
This section is concerned with the case of search goods, where the quality of rival goods is
clearly discernible before purchase. As noted above, this corresponds to the “full informa-
tion” case in the literature on adaptive learning. CR considered only experience goods, but
the search goods case provides an interesting point of comparison.
For the moment, let us assume that the qualities of both goods are constant and exogenous
and given by u1, u2. Under full information at each point in time, consumers are able to
observe the utility from consumption of each good. They are assumed to update their
estimates θ accordingly. In particular, consider
θit+1 = (1− δ)θit + δui for i = 1, 2 (11)
where 1 > δ ≥ 0 is a forgetting parameter. Much of the learning literature has considered
learning with no forgetting, for example, fictitious play. However, the assumption of forget-
ting seems particularly appropriate in this context (indeed CR estimate δ at well above 0
from actual sales data). The continuous time equivalent learning rule is
θ˙i = δ(ui − θi) for i = 1, 2 (12)
Note that here, just as in CR’s original model, price does not aﬀect goodwill. There
are arguments for and against this modelling choice. The model is intended to represent the
situation of a consumer choosing between products in a supermarket, where prices are clearly
displayed. In that sense, because current prices are easily available, the consumer’s choice
may not be aﬀected by her knowledge of past prices. On the other hand, a consumer may
not check prices again each time he shops. In which case, his choice in a particular period
may be determined by his impression about which of the brands is the least expensive, an
impression formed by past prices.
In any case, in the present case of observable quality, there is a particularly simple
outcome. The Hamiltonian in this case is given by
Hi = pixi + µiδ(ui − θi) + νiδ(uj − θj) (13)
Because the updating of goodwill according to (12) does not depend on which good is
purchased and hence is not a function of price, the dynamic equilibrium is simply to play
a standard duopoly equilibrium at each point in time. That is, the dynamic first order
conditions (9) reduce to
∂Hi
∂pi
= xi + piγxixj = 0 for i = 1, 2 (14)
or
pi = −
1
γxj
(15)
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Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) show that this first order condition identifies a unique equilibrium
in pure strategies to this game. However, it is diﬃcult to obtain an exact solution for the
implied price dynamics. However, one has
p˙i −
x˙j
γx2j
= 0 (16)
and one can calculate that at each point in time
θi(t) = ui(1− e−δt)− θi(0)e−δt.
Or in other words, in the limit, θi = ui. That is, the consumer correctly learns the utility
she derives from each product. Since in the limit, the sellers cannot influence her opinion,
the steady state prices are the same as those arising from a static duopoly (or if the firms
were completely myopic).
Proposition 3 In the steady state, prices are given by the solution to the static duopoly
game where demands are given by the choice rule (5) and θi = ui.
5 Experience Goods
In this section, the model is developed under the assumption that the quality of a good is
only observable upon consumption. This is CR’s original model with slight modifications
as noted above. In particular, one can think of the change in goodwill for the consumer
following what is now the standard reinforcement learning updating rule (see, for example,
Erev and Roth, 1998). That is, if action/good i is chosen at time t, then
θit+1 = (1− δ)θit + ui
θjt+1 = (1− δ)θjt
(17)
Moving to the expected motion and continuous time, one obtains
θ˙i = xiui − δθi. (18)
The Hamiltonian becomes
Hi = pixi + µi(xiui − δθi) + νi(xjuj − δθj). (19)
Diﬀerentiating Hi with respect to pi and setting to zero, prices must satisfy
pi = −
1
γxj
+ νi − µi. (20)
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From this, it is possible to obtain
p˙i − (r + δ)pi +
βxi(ui + uj)
γ
− r + δ
γxj
− x˙j
γx2j
= 0 (21)
As CR calculate, the steady state is characterised by the following equations
pi =
1
γ(r + δ)
Ã
β(ui + uj)δθi
ui
− (r + δ)uj
δθj
!
, xiui = δθi (22)
First, it is interesting to compare the steady state prices with those obtained in the
previous section under full information. From (22) above, one can calculate that
pi =
β(ui + uj)δθi
uiγ(r + δ)
− 1
γxj
. (23)
If ui and uj are both positive, then the above price will be lower than −1/γxj, the price
obtained under full information (the two prices will coincide if the firms are myopic, i.e.
r = ∞). Strangely, the additional information available in the full information model,
actually makes prices less competitive.
This is not the full story, however. The equations (22) in fact typically are consistent
with three distinct steady states. For example, with u1 = u2 = 1, the two firms are in eﬀect
identical. However, if one assumes for convenience that δ = 1/2, γ = −1, r = 1,β = 2, there
are steady states with θ = (0.645, 1.355), θ = (1, 1), and θ = (1.355, 0.645), one symmetric,
and two highly asymmetric. What is going on?
If one fixes prices and looks at the behaviour of consumer learning in the neighbourhood
of a steady state with the same parameter values as before
x˙i = βxi(1− xi)(θ˙i − θ˙j) = βxi(1− xi)(2xi − 1− δ(θi − θj)).
But from the choice rule (5), with prices fixed, β(θj − θi) = log(1− xi)− log xi. This gives
x˙i = βxi(1− xi)
Ã
2xi − 1 +
δ
β
(log(1− xi)− log xi)
!
. (24)
This is a perturbed form of the evolutionary replicator dynamic.4 One can calculate that
it does have a fixed point at xi = 1/2, the symmetric outcome one would expect given the
firms are themselves symmetric. But one can also calculate that this outcome is unstable.
This reflects the result of Rustichini (1999) that under partial information, learning with the
exponential choice rule can converge to a suboptimal outcome. For example, the equation
4For more detailed analysis of the connection between learning processes and the replicator dynamics,
see Hopkins (2001).
8
(24) also has fixed points at xi ≈ 0 and xi ≈ 1, which will be stable under these learning
dynamics.
That is, a consumer can, by pure force of habit, become locked into purchasing one good
repeatedly. This is mitigated in practice by the firm which is receiving less custom reducing
its price to compensate. For example, from the numerical example above, at the steady
state θ = (0.645, 1.355), prices will be (0.616, 1.293). This is why in this asymmetric steady
state, market shares are (0.3225, 0.6775) and not (0,1). Nonetheless, this model implies a
considerable first-mover advantage. If initial conditions are such that the consumer has a
marked preference for one firm, one would expect convergence to an asymmetric outcome.5
6 Experience Goods with an Alternative Learning Model
Sarin and Vahid (1999) propose a new learning model which is particularly applicable when
an agent has partial information in the sense of Rustichini (1999). Or, in the present context,
it should be adapted to the case of experience goods.
The rule is, if action/good i is chosen at time t, then
θit+1 = (1− δ)θit + δui
θjt+1 = θjt
(25)
The diﬀerence between this rule and the rule (17) in the previous section is that now the
goodwill toward the good not chosen does not decay. This may seem a slight diﬀerence, but
it is crucial. Because one’s estimate of the quality of the good not chosen will remain above
zero, this prevents one becoming locked into the other good through pure choice of habit.
Assuming as before decision rule (5), and moving to expected motion and continuous
time, one obtains
θ˙i = xiδ(ui − θi). (26)
It is possible to obtain
p˙i − rpi +
δβxi(ui − θi + uj − θj)
γ
− r
γxj
− x˙j
γx2j
= 0 (27)
In the steady state one can calculate from (26) that θi = ui for i = 1, 2 and from (27) one
can see that prices are pi = −1/(γxj), just as in (15). Hence, we have
5Numerical analysis suggests that all three steady states are saddlepoints under the dynamics investigated
here. This means that all three are attainable asymptotically.
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Proposition 4 In the model of experience goods with the Sarin and Vahid learning model,
asymptotically the consumer has a correct perception of the quality of the two goods, θi = ui,
and the two sellers charge the myopic duopoly prices.
That is, just as in the case of learning under complete information considered in Section
3, there is complete learning. In the limit, the consumer knows the true values of u1 and u2,
and the firms cannot influence his beliefs. As a consequence, prices asymptotically approach
their myopic levels. The two steady states, under complete information and under partial
information with the learning rule of Sarin and Vahid considered in this section, are identical.
Of course, this does not imply that the dynamics out of equilibrium are identical. Indeed,
the two equations (16) and (27) are quite diﬀerent. This reflects that here the two firms
play the myopic equilibrium only asymptotically, but in the case of full information, prices
are set myopically at each point in time.
7 Going Beyond a Representative Consumer
The use of a representative consumer makes our models more tractable, but it is not ideal.
Equally, assuming that the utility from consumption is constant means that any learning
undertaken is trivial. In this section, I investigate the implications of relaxing both assump-
tions, using a method of aggregation across a population of learners first used in Hopkins
(1999).
First, let us assume that there is a large, formally infinite, population of consumers, each
with goodwill θ = (θ1, θ2). Let q = θ2 − θ1. Then the beliefs of the population can be
described by a distribution F (q) on IR. The choice rule (5) can be written
x1t(q, p) =
1
1 + exp(βqt + γ(p2t − p1t))
(28)
and demand for the first firm is
D1(F (q), p) =
Z
x1(q, p)dF (q). (29)
Second, suppose that instead of quality being constant, it is subject to stochastic varia-
tion. In particular, assume that ui = u¯i + ²i for i = 1, 2 and each ²i is a random variable,
normally distributed with zero expectation and standard deviation σ. So if ² = ²2− ²1, then
² is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation
√
2σ.
In this stochastic setting we obtain quite diﬀerent results.
Proposition 5 Under rule (11) and under (25), asymptotically F (q) converges to a normal
distribution Φ(q) with mean u¯2 − u¯1 and standard deviation σ
q
2δ/(2− δ).
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That is, the dispersion of the asymptotic distribution of beliefs depends positively on the
variance of payoﬀs and the degree of forgetting. This has important consequences.
Proposition 6 Let γ = −β so that goodwill is a perfect substitute for price. In the limit,
lim
β→∞
D1(F (q), p) = F (p2 − p1).
Note that in the deterministic settings of Sections 3 and 5, the asymptotic distribution is
just a mass point at q = u¯2− u¯1. Hence, the above result implies as the degree of sensitivity
to prices becomes very large, we approach Bertrand competition. For example, if u¯1 = u¯2
then the firm which charges a price lower by ² will have a market share of 1. However, with
stochastic utility, because the asymptotic distribution is non-degenerate, price competition
is muted. A firm can charge a higher price than its rival and still have a positive market
share. For example, assume u¯1 = u¯2, then D1 = Φ(p2 − p1), where Φ is the distribution
function for the limiting distribution established in Proposition 5, and one can calculate that
in a static duopoly equilibrium,
p1 = p2 =
s
δπ
2− δσ > 0.
Equilibrium prices are above the competitive level. How far above depends positively on
the variance of the noise, and the level of forgetting. If qualities are unequal, then there is no
analytic solution. However, numerical analysis reveals that if for example σ = 1/2, δ = 2/3,
|u¯2 − u¯1| = 1, then the disadvantaged firm still has a market share of 15% in equilibrium.
Recently, Capra et al. (2000) have examined how a small amount of bounded rationality
on the part of sellers can lead to substantial deviation from competitive outcomes under
Betrand competition. Here, learning by consumers fails to be complete allowing substantial
softening of price competition.
The case of the model of CR is much more complex. Since the evolution of beliefs depends
on which good is purchased, the path of prices will aﬀect what will be the final distribution of
beliefs. Simulation for fixed prices suggests that beliefs converge to a bimodal distribution,
with acculmulations at q = −u¯1 and q = u¯2. This suggests that under this learning rule, the
environment will be less competitive still. But this analysis for the moment will have to be
left to future research.
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